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Defending Intimacy against What?
Limits of Antisurrogacy Feminisms
I t is now a simple fact that surrogacy is a booming, global business,” readsa memorandum posted under the heading “The Parentage/SurrogacyProject” at the Hague Conference on Private International Law.1 But
the ambivalent term “parentage/surrogacy” implies a philosophical open-
mindedness about the difference between the two terms that is reﬂected al-
most nowhere else in public discourse. In fact, the enterprise known as sur-
rogacy rests, deﬁnitionally, on a guarantee of certainty about the difference
between parent and surrogate, a certainty that is not always shared by all of
the participants involved (the surrogate, the commissioning parties, clini-
cians, and so on). As the ambivalent slash in the memo’s title implies, then,
surrogacy provides a way of either expanding or disturbing the prevalent
construction of parentage. The destabilization of parentage—surrogacy’s
possibilities for politically transforming kinship—is the theme with which
I ultimately conclude. To that end, it will beneﬁt this discussion to establish
a working deﬁnition of the practice of parentage/surrogacy, whose ﬁssures
future iconoclastic redeﬁnitions can exploit.
Surrogacy denotes a practice of third-party reproduction in which a per-
son is contracted via a clinic to be implanted with one or more embryos and
to gestate the result(s) to term. A commercial surrogate receives a fee, the
disbursement of which (across trimesters) varies by country (Briggs 2010).
The surrogate’s exclusive capacity to undertake a pregnancy is leased to one
or more infertile individuals, who subsequently own a stake in the means of
production: her reproductive biology. This grounds a corresponding claim
upon the hoped-for product, living progeny, which more often than not de-
notes genetic progeny, although donor gametes are also used (Thompson
2005). Assuming the pregnancy has gone smoothly, the surrogate is con-
tractually bound to relinquish all parental claims soon after the delivery,
which is carried out by caesarean section in a disproportionate number of
cases (Rudrappa 2015). Notwithstanding myriad news stories about indi-
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vidual cases of surrogacy in national and international presses, the uncon-
ventional gestational provenance of many children systematically goes un-
noted on birth certiﬁcates. The everyday existence of surrogacy among pop-
ulations remains unknown to many.
The pregnancy itself—heavily punctuated by blood testing and trans-
vaginal ultrasounds—plays out like any intensely medically mediated preg-
nancy, within and through the living body of the pregnancy worker. How-
ever, its noncoital initiation—via in-vitro fertilization (IVF) and related
procedures—places surrogacy symbolically under the authority of experts:
the proﬁting clinicians, clinical brokers, and associated attorneys, whose ad-
vertisements (about half a million of them) populate the web.
The global hubs of the biomedical market in assisted reproductive technol-
ogy are rapidly shifting as a result of legislative crackdowns (Bindel 2016). In
many countries, a large proportion of the infants birthed by surrogate gestat-
ors are intended for foreign commissioning parents and can typically be reg-
istered fairly straightforwardly at the hospital as foreign nationals. This said,
mishaps within the transnational choreography of surrogacy have repeatedly
occurred, raising the specter of “stateless” babies trapped in “limbo” (Batha
2014), abandoned babies who might then be “sold” to other foreigners
(Groom 2014), and other baby-centered calamities. Rudy Rupak, surrogacy
broker and former CEO of the medical tourism company PlanetHospital, for
example, described himself as “an uncle to about 750 kids around the globe”
before he was convicted for fraud (ABC Australia 2014). Rupak (not an iso-
lated case) took huge sums from would-be parents and initiated embryo
transfers involving many low-income women in India, Thailand, andMexico,
prior to ﬂeeing those operations midstream (Lewin 2014). Anxious but unde-
terred by such outrages, afﬂuent commissioning couples—desperate for ba-
bies—still travel to spaces at the geopolitical periphery to avail themselves
of infertility care according to a pattern that is familiar from colonialism and
outsourcing (Vora 2015).
Antisurrogacy’s heyday was in the mid-1980s, before this neocolonial
structure of surrogacy labor markets had been established. However, calls
for the abolition of surrogacy—couched in the same universalizing feminist
terms—have returned to international public life. In what follows, I ana-
lyze the past and now-resurgent Euro-American and Australian anglophone
feminist-abolitionist stance toward surrogacy (particularly as it is epitomized
by the Feminist International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and
Genetic Engineering [FINRRAGE]), contextualizing it in relation to sex-
worker-exclusionary antitrafﬁcking discourses, on the one hand, and trans-
phobic imaginaries, on the other. These analogously truncated abolitionisms,
I argue, perform opposition to commodiﬁcation rather than to capitalism.
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If solidarity with gestational workers (as with sex workers and trans people)
is to be achieved, I argue, scholars must recognize the limitations of anti-
surrogacy’s technophobic body politics and seek to understand the com-
monalities between relations deemed “natural” and those deemed “surro-
gate.”
Current scholarly approaches to surrogacy
Much surrogacy scholarship has prioritized the dimension of reproductive
tourism, weaving ethnographies that parse surrogacy clinics’ complex asym-
metries of power into political theory for a biocapitalist epoch (Pande 2014;
Vora 2015). These scholars overwhelmingly argue that the value of regula-
tory action on surrogacy is contingent on whether it can be informed by—or
otherwise centered around—the structural interests of those who become
surrogate workers. Their perspectives, as such, do not inform the various na-
tional bans on cross-border surrogacy that were announced in late 2015,
notably by the three former transnational surrogacy hubs exploited by Rupak
prior to his imprisonment: India, Thailand, and the state of Tabasco, Mex-
ico. For example, Sharmila Rudrappa’s rich history of Indian assisted re-
productive technology (ART) policy making and account of present-day
surrogacy workplaces, Discounted Life, concludes: “If and when surrogate
mothers are treated as full human beings, with respect for their emotional,
physical, and intellectual well-being, their sense of self, dignity, and body
intact, then I am an advocate of commercial transnational surrogacy” (Ru-
drappa 2015, 174). Similarly, Amrita Pande,weighing the desirability of ban-
ning surrogacy at the close ofWombs in Labor, mentions the ways in which
surrogate contracts can temporarily disrupt the gendered division of labor
in the household and mediate gains for some low-income Indian women
(Pande 2014, 172–78). And Kalindi Vora, in Life Support, juxtaposes the la-
bor struggle facing Indian surrogates with that of Indian call center agents
and information technology programmers, all of whom she sees as gendered
service workers producing vital energy and affective commodities that ﬂow
toward the global North (Vora 2015).
Critiques of this type, needless to say, are not antisurrogacy; nor, despite
Rudrappa’s conditional statement, are they prosurrogacy. All treat contract
gestation as a multistranded extraction of vitality, care, and stigmatized inti-
mate labor—akin to sex work—thereby illuminating forms of unfreedom
and pain that touch every confrontation between capital and the living hu-
man body in different ways and to different degrees. They also incite a latent
struggle, to be fought by surrogacy workers themselves, against the structur-
ally gendered and racialized degradations that waged reproducers of life and
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of class society face (Boris and Parreñas 2010). Eileen Boris and Rhacel Sa-
lazar Parreñas’s seminal collection Intimate Labors (2010) was among those
to begin treating professional surrogates as part of a historic group—from
migrant maids, nannies, and hostesses to sex workers—whose service is ﬁg-
ured as dirtied by commerce, in contrast to the supposedly free or natural
love acts of an angelic white bourgeois femininity it in fact makes possible
(see also Glenn 1992; Roberts 1997).
Yet outside academia, very little activist discourse has emerged that makes
this point. While everyday feminism readily makes claims about housework,
one rarely hears anyone express the idea that surrogates have always been ev-
erywhere—which could challenge assumptions around themoral exception-
ality of surrogacy vis-à-vis the “normal” institutions of making a family.
When surrogacy appears in our news feeds, the same anxious apriority always
undergirds the narrative: we’ve entered a brave new world of technological
(read: unnatural) procreation (Moore 2014). The anxiety is substantial.
Seen as antithetical to so-called traditional family values, surrogacy can sym-
bolize reproductive dystopias of both misogynist and matriarchal hues. If
Dr. Frankenstein’s act of creation can be viewed, dichotomously, as either
the ultimate in individualist, techno-euphoric, patriarchal hubris or as amon-
strous and uncontrollable maternity made of multiple unearthed proletarian
bodies, surrogacy too conjures up both interpretations.
At both ends, however, reproductive technology risks being ahistoricized
and misrecognized as in itself productive—its fruits treated as utterly differ-
ent from the normal basis of the family. Yet the normative institution of the
family remains as much in need of critique as ever. The emergence of the
family’s artiﬁcially assisted double should not distract us from this critique,
or lead us to jettison it. In fact, treating surrogacy as a new and wholly dif-
ferent phenomenon may paradoxically contribute to ensuring that it is prac-
ticed in the service of an old, or existing, logic, thereby foreclosing whatever
alter-familial tendencies or alternative visions of kinship, it can potentially af-
ford (Strathern 1998).
A family-critical feminist literature on antiprostitution and antitrafﬁcking
campaigns has mapped how certain feminisms (themselves relatively uncrit-
ical of the family, at least when it comes to the family in the third world), are
deployed to neocolonial and neoliberal ends (Agustín 2007; Bernstein 2010;
Kempadoo 2015). In Elizabeth Bernstein’s account of the rise of sex-work-
abolitionist antitrafﬁcking discourses, a focus on sexual violation located out-
side the family, “rather than the structural preconditions of exploited labor
more generally, has been crucial to transformingwhat had previously been of
concern to only a small group of committed activists into a legal framework
with powerful material and symbolic effects” (Bernstein 2010, 49). While
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the parallels with antisurrogacy feminisms here are suggestive, there is a
dearth of comparable meta-analyses of feminist antisurrogacy, which this
discussion seeks to redress.
The critique of the corporate feminist, NGO-led “rescue industry” posits
that apparently inarguable mainstream assertions of women’s rights often
become amethod of legitimizingmisdirected “rescuemissions” that patron-
ize and materially harm sex workers everywhere (Agustín 2007). This fem-
inist humanitarianism stands accused of abetting, among other things, car-
ceral “solutions” to the “problem” of informal economies, local economic
reforms (neoliberalism’s “structural adjustment”), and even militarized
campaigns in the name of downtrodden women: the “modern-day white
(wo)man’s burden” (Kempadoo 2015). In the discussion that follows, I pro-
pose that antisurrogacy is and often has been animated by similar structures
of neoimperialist humanitarian feminism. This parallel is intended to encour-
age surrogacy’s interlocutors, including surrogates themselves, to highlight
afﬁnities between an emerging surrogate-led politics and other, far more
long-standing feminist-anticapitalist struggles grounded in the domain of
sexual services.
It has taken sex workers’ unions and collectives decades to advocate effec-
tively for their trade’s decriminalization, but a breakthrough was achieved in
2015 when Amnesty International announced its support (Bolton 2015).
This decisionwas greetedwith outrage by those prone to conﬂating sexwork
with enslavement and trafﬁcking. But sex workers and their allies had made
a leap toward recognition of the “structural preconditions of exploited la-
bor” (Bernstein 2010, 49). In my view, stakeholders in the politics of sur-
rogacy might beneﬁt from studying the methods used by the sex-work-
decriminalization movement. By no means is the alliance between sex work
and surrogacy universally welcomed; as Pande notes in her title, “Not an ‘an-
gel,’ not a ‘whore’ ” (2009; emphasis added).
Indeed, it has been documented that many surrogates explicitly shun any
comparison between gestational outsourcing and prostitution, even as they
lay claim to some degree of “dirtiness” in their labor (Rudrappa 2015).
However, much like antiprostitution sentiment, antisurrogacy is character-
ized by a stigmatizing sexual imaginary. Antisurrogacy sees the body in ques-
tion as victimized, compromised, and polluted but also as literally reiﬁed
or even mechanized—rendered undesirably and unnaturally cyborg—by
the act of commodifying and selling these services perceived to be uniquely
of the “self.” Many of the most prominent antisurrogacy campaigners ex-
plicitly link sex work with surrogacy as a “dog whistle” signaling their moral
condemnation of both. But this provides all the more reason to believe, by
analogy, that unless an unapologetic—contaminated, hacked, and cyborg—
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gestational workplace can be vindicated in feminist theory and practice, the
emerging future of surrogacy activism looks set to be plunged into these
same vexed and polarizing dynamics.
To recap, themost up-to-date scholarship on surrogacy locates it not only
within new macroeconomic trends (outsourcing, bioinformatics) but also
old ones: the feudal, colonial, racial, and classed women’s labors that have
always supported the realization of the Western nuclear family and that still
stand in the wings of “natural,” bourgeois childbirth (Glenn 1992; Roberts
1997; Vora 2015). We must resist the temptation to treat surrogacy as new
and as different from the “innocent” family—whether we think surrogacy is
better than that family or worse—for our political ends. And we can resist
this temptation without minimizing harmful (perhaps even uniquely harm-
ful) experiences attributable to modern-day surrogacy’s domain. In the dis-
cussion that follows, I apply these epistemic commitments to a consideration
of antisurrogacy discourses articulated in the name of women. Speciﬁcally,
what does a feminist antisurrogacy see as threatening to women’s bodies?
What is gestational intimacy being defended against? And how does such a
discourse relate to constituencies that oppose surrogacy precisely on un-
or antifeminist grounds?
The FINRRAGE position
Since 2010, the Guardian and the Observer have published multiple col-
umns emblematic of a new antisurrogacy feminism that characterizes trans-
national commercial surrogacy as “misery and pain [for] women who will
end up being viewed as nothing but a vessel” (Bindel 2016), “womb trafﬁck-
ing” (Bindel 2015), “pimping” (Bindel 2011), “dehumanising” (Bennett
2015), and “a repulsive trade . . . a twisted version of slavery” (Moore
2014). These denunciations emerged after a comparative lapse in speciﬁcally
feminist antisurrogacy propaganda since its heyday in the late 1980s. How-
ever, they reproduce the core tropes of degradation, commodiﬁcation, vio-
lation, “slavery,” and prostitution that marked this earlier work.
These tropes were ﬁrst deployed by FINRRAGE. FINRRAGE was a
loosely structured international women’s network with branches (at its
apogee) in thirty-seven countries across multiple continents, composed over-
whelmingly of “very highly educated and middle-class” women with PhDs,
according to ethnographer Stevienna de Saille (2012, 34). It was dedi-
cated to “knowledge production, rather than protest” (iv): researching, in-
terpreting, and thereby eradicating—through feminist advocacy—speciﬁc
reproduction-related practices. At minimum, these included surrogacy, IVF,
and embryo transfer, and for somemembers also chemical/hormonal contra-
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ceptives and prenatal screening (amniocentesis); the range was an ongoing
matter of internal dispute (Rozario 1999; de Saille 2012). FINRRAGE was
founded at a conference in Groningen in 1984 (originally as FINRRET: Fem-
inist International Network on New Reproductive Technologies); the ﬁve
founding members were all white Euro-American scholars: Robyn Rowland,
Jalna Hanmer, Renate Klein, Gena Corea, and Janice Raymond. In 1985,
FINRRAGE resolved at its inaugural conference: “We, women . . ., declare
that the female body . . . is being exploited and dissected as raw material for
the technological production of human beings.”2 The “new reproductive
technologies,” this manifesto insisted, represented “a declaration of war.”
AsNadiaMahjouri has argued, these “radical feminist” antisurrogacy cam-
paigners were mired in “dichotomous thought” (2004). The starkest ex-
pressions were provided by Raymond: “there is no way that a surrogate con-
tract can be made anything other than an inherently unequal relationship
between broker, sperm donor, and a woman involving the objectiﬁcation,
sale, and commodiﬁcation of a woman’s body” (1989c, 65). A former Cath-
olic nun, Raymond is most infamous for authoring the antitranssexual pro-
paganda fountainhead The Transsexual Empire (1979), which, as Susan
Stryker and Stephen Whittle characterize it, “seriously advances the claim
that male medical doctors are involved in a conspiracy to create a race of ar-
tiﬁcial women” (2006, 131). Raymond’s transphobic fantasy is nearly iden-
tical to the fantasy expressed in the title of the FINRRAGE edited collection
Man-Made Women (Corea et al. 1987). Transition surgeries and contract
pregnancies were two facets of a seemimgly omnipotent “male” war on or in-
vasion of the “female.” Regulation, Raymond wrote, “will not save women
from being treated as reproductive commodities. Regulating surrogacy is
like regulating slavery” (1989c, 65). Raymond’s appropriation of the lan-
guage of antislavery is designed to hammer home FINRRAGE’s long-term
aim to abolish all reproductive “engineering” (Woll 1992). As a strategy this
involves holding diverse forms of obstetric health care in contempt, rather
than envisioning their capture and redesign by feminist agents. Indeed, many
within FINRRAGE explicitly scorned the “technophilic” feminist visionary
Shulamith Firestone, who argued for just such a seizure of the means of re-
production (Lublin 1998, 37).
Recall that in the 1970s Firestone had proposed an “ectogenic utopia”
(Lublin 1998, 37), a communist society mediated by reproductive technol-
ogies that would be instantiated by women themselves as a “sex-class” (Fire-
stone [1970] 2015, 9)—escaping the burden of childbearing; desacraliz-
2 See FINRRAGE’s report, “International Conference Lund—Sweden,” http://www
.ﬁnrrage.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Finrrage_Conference_Lund_Sweden_1985.pdf.
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ing it; and, using test tubes, automating the process. It is possible that
FINRRAGE arose, then, as a reaction to the cyberfeminism Firestone repre-
sented, as much as to the “repro-engineers.” Repudiating Firestone’s posi-
tion, FINRRAGE’s in-house laboratory biologist Robyn Rowland wrote
that the problem was irreducible to the fact that “women do not control
these technologies. . . . If they did, they [still] could not purify the technol-
ogy out of its political base. . . . The technology and the purpose for its
development are . . . perfectly co-joined” (1992, 292). While Rowland,
Raymond, and other FINRRAGE leaders shared Firestone’s ﬂattening lan-
guage of “sex class” to refer to their constituent population, their projects
otherwise could hardly have differed more.
In its peak years of operation (1986–93), FINRRAGE mounted a suc-
cessful challenge to many capitalist biogenetic corporations, whose operat-
ing impunity their research demonstrably restrained (Woll 1992). Numer-
ous feminists today, confronting structures of reproductive unfreedom still
faced by so many women both inside and outside the workplace, mention
their desire to revive FINNRAGE’s militancy or mobilize it toward differ-
ent ends (such as socializing child care). “I miss the pissed off-ness of the
FINNRAGE position, even though I think it is wrong,” represents a fairly
typical sentiment (Briggs 2010, 371). Yet, already in the 1980s, the anti-
technology formula had come to be resented by many FINRRAGE sympa-
thizers as Manichaean doxa. Before FINRRAGE’s decline, Lisa Woll inter-
viewed rank-and-ﬁle members and found that many of them considered the
tenor of the group’s global general assemblies to be rigidly hierarchical and
the ﬁve leaders undemocratic and dogmatic (Woll 1992). North American
socialist feminists external to the group, like Michelle Stanworth, Rosalind
Petchesky, and Rayna Rapp, were indeed routinely lambasted in the (non–
peer reviewed) FINRRAGE journalReproductive and Genetic Engineering:
Journal of International Feminist Analaysis for their supposed “reproduc-
tive liberalism” (Raymond 1989c) and betrayal of women. In a characteris-
tically contemptuous riposte to the bad external reviews FINRRAGE pub-
lications were attracting, one of the leaders wrote: “there was a time when
it was honorable—not caricaturable—to be on the ‘front lines’” (Raymond
1989c).
Yet what animated opposition to the FINRRAGE leadership’s line within
the feminist movement—and even within FINRRAGE itself—was precisely
a sense that FINRRAGE was not “on the front lines” and was not qualiﬁed
to make claims in the name of women. Some less prominent voices within
FINRRAGE sought to deﬁne their core concern as being not technology
but relations of reproductive stratiﬁcation—the class ﬁssures among and be-
tween geographically disparate women, as Patricia Spallone and Deborah
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Steinberg wrote: “we resolutely oppose all attempts through genetic and re-
productive engineering, to bring about a racist and fascist division of women
into ‘valuable’ women in the industrial world, who should have children,
and ‘inferior’women in exploited countries who are forbidden to have chil-
dren” (1987, 212). Here, reproductive technologies are deﬁned as factors
reproducing an extractive neocolonial system. Nancy Lublin praises this
minority within FINRRAGE for “frequently point[ing] out that not all
women experience oppression to the same extent or in the same fashion”
(1998, 67). While highlighting commonalities between FINRRAGE and
ecofeminism—which Lublin deﬁnes as the a priori rejection of technology
as “anti-woman”—she even charitably notes that “FINRRAGE does not
advocate a blanket prohibition” on all reproductive technologies (1998,
50, 67).
Despite this and other claims for a nonabolitionist politics within FINR-
RAGE (Franklin 2011), it is relatively clear that the network’s impetus and
underlying anxiety was a class-blind fear of the so-called “Death of the
Female” (this being the title of a crucial panel from the originary 1984 Gro-
ningen conference). FINNRAGE perceived a threat to individual and col-
lective female control over women’s supposed sole distinguishing power—
the ability to procreate—and foresaw this loss as leading to women’s social
redundancy and forced subordination to mechanical methods for continu-
ing the species (Woll 1992; Lublin 1998; de Saille 2014). Renate Klein’s ral-
lying cry was to “resist becoming test tube women” (in Lublin 1998, 70). In
parsing the assumptions behind this imperative, Dion Farquhar is less diplo-
matic: “according to the feminist anti-reproductive technology narrative, a
phallocratic conspiracy of woman-hating, womb-envying ‘pharmacrats’ foist
their high-priced, risky, invasive, and low-success-rate reproductive technol-
ogies on the class of ‘natural’ women” (1998, 192). Note that “pharmacrat
and technodoc are derogatory words coined by Gena Corea to describe the
medics, lawyers and businessmen who control and proﬁt from the reproduc-
tive technology industry” (Lublin 1998, 73).
It appears legitimate to at least pose the question of whether FINRRAGE
instrumentalized the ﬁrst wave of surrogacy laborers almost to the same ex-
tent as the “technodocs” did. Corea and Raymond, in the collectionRecon-
structing Babylon (Hynes 1989), describe surrogacy as “pimping” (Corea
1989a, 41) and tantamount to “slavery” (Raymond 1989b, 83), dismissing
women’s experiences of altruism in surrogacy as patriarchal brainwashing.
Their academic and activist strategy hinged less on rigorous argumentation
than on attempts at inserting terminology into legal and policy circles in
hopes of their generalized uptake, for example, in the agency-erasing effort
to replace the term “surrogates”with “womenused in systems of surrogacy”
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(WUSS; Raymond 1989a). Similar problems arise in Corea’s incendiary
“Junk Liberty.” The latter combines a list of the names and afﬁliations of
“criminal” doctors or brokers with a heavily stylized catalog of sorrows, in-
tended to indict surrogacy as a self-evident “crime” (Corea 1989b, 182).
“Junk Liberty” is in part a kind of dirge created out of the names of, quotes
from, and stories of speciﬁc former surrogates who are positioned as survi-
vors or martyrs: Alejandra Muñoz, Laurie Yates, Nancy Barrass, Mary Beth
Whitehead, Patty Foster, and Elizabeth Kane. The tactic implies, but fails
to demonstrate, that all these women support total abolition.
Certainly, the famous ﬁgurehead Elizabeth Kane did support abolition;
her 1988 book BirthMother inveighed against the pain caused by surrogacy.
But the desires and views of the ﬁrst generation of American working-class
surrogates were not the determining factor for FINRRAGE’s political pro-
gram. “Junk Liberty” is a propaganda tour de force, punctuated by Corea’s
own personal avowals of grief, mourning, and “white rage” (1989b, 178).
But these distract from her ventriloquism of her subjects, and it is unclear
what evidence would not bolster Corea’s conclusion, since “it is the ‘happy
surrogates,’ the ‘Stepford surrogates,’ I worry about” (181). Explicitly, Corea
writes, “the cases which are alleged to be smooth and happy are the ones I
worry aboutmost” (179). Choice and desire alike are discredited in favor of
the immutable and certain standard of women’s dignity. “She”—themyth-
ical happy surrogate—“hears herself described as . . . an incubator, a kind
of hatchery, a rented property. . . . She protests none of this” (180). Luck-
ily, it is implied, FINRRAGE is here to rescue her.
It is in this context, as Sarah Franklin notices, that many veteran thinkers
on reproductive technologies now view FINRRAGE’s legacy with embar-
rassment, sensing that “it is crucial to avoid the denunciatory rhetoric . . .
associated with the so-called ‘FINRRAGE position’” (Franklin 2011, 17).
Inmy view, the crucial question is, rather, what one is denouncing. Then as
now, FINRRAGE’s a priori repudiation of infertility technologies as “male
violence” was often seen by fellow travelers—committed revolutionary
feminists like Firestone and others—as an atavistic, incongruous, and polit-
ically elitist gesture that could never strike fear into the heart of the patri-
archal technocratic state. Despite the prominent presence within it of Ma-
ria Mies (author of Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale [1986]),
FINRRAGE was never regarded as an organ of anticapitalist analysis. Those
with a primary interest in blocking capitalist accumulation and outsourcing
in the new bioeconomies dropped out of FINRRAGE in the 1990s. In the
twenty-ﬁrst century, if FINRRAGE lives on, it is only insofar as it never for-
mally disbanded. A small, die-hard number of its Australian members con-
tinued to publish a version of the once-international newsletter until 2000.
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The contents of this slim, last publicly available issue comprise ﬁve short col-
umns that denounce pornography, gene therapy, and abortion.3
The medical abuse of “woman” argument
For Farquhar, FINRRAGE at its best was to be lauded for its anticontrac-
tarianism: its members’ insistence that kinship ties are ineffably intimate re-
lationships that cannot, should not, be treated as property. Yet—leaving
aside the nowadays easily dismissed view of biomedicine, among other things,
as male violence—it was ultimately also a “legislative feminism” (Farquhar
1998, 192). As such, FINRRAGE’s thought differed surprisingly little from
the liberalism it excoriated, for its demands betrayed a naive and unfounded
trust in the state as the alternative to the male avatars of the market. Its dualist
worldview, whereby bodily fragmentation and manipulation are univocally
bad while holism, purity, and freedom from male use are univocally good,
was epitomized by Renate Klein inWomen as Body Parts, at the core of which
lay the idea that women can really be “reduced” to wombs and even to inert
“matter” (Klein 1991, 394). In Raymond’s formulation, it was Women as
Wombs: “The sexual objectiﬁcation and violation of women is made invisible
[to women themselves] because technological reproduction has . . . trans-
formed medicalized abuse into standard treatment . . . the appropriation of
the female body” (Raymond 1993, xxxi). In response to the objection that
women often desire embodied technologies, even if the interventions in ques-
tion manifest dynamics of domination or appropriation in a clinical setting,
Raymond explicitly insisted on the irrelevance of desire to feminist politics.
“Desire has become the determining factor,” she lamented; “desire becomes
deterministic” (1989c).
But all medical practices appropriate bodies in some way, and—contra
Raymond—many feminist texts explicitly repudiate the idea that people can
never desire their own bodies’ appropriation in any context, especially partially
or temporarily (see, e.g., Petchesky 1987; Taylor 2000). Indeed, the role of
experts within lesbian-separatist self-insemination collectives has long demon-
strated the opposite. Likewise, the transfeminist Catalan laboratory collective
GynePunk has explicitly unearthed the violent history of early gynecological
research—conducted without anesthesia on enslaved plantation laborers in
the mid-nineteenth century—as part of their politicized search for emanci-
patory ways to manipulate and “hack” reproductive bodies in the twenty-ﬁrst
(Chardronnet 2015).
3 FINRRAGE Journal, April 2000, http://www.ﬁnrrage.org/wp-content/uploads
/2016/03/FINRRAGE_Newsletter_2000.pdf.
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Unlike GynePunk, FINRRAGE’s “radical” language of “medicalized
abuse” is aligned with mainstream policy statements today. The European
Parliament preempted antisurrogacy actions at the Hague in December
2015 by provisionally resolving that surrogacy should be proscribed, with-
out exception, on the grounds that it “violates women’s dignity and human
rights” and makes their bodies “marchandises,” particularly in developing
countries.4 Many modern antisurrogacy groups celebrated the news. Senti-
mental symbols of an idealized natural maternity—pregnant bellies fostering
mother-fetus bonding in a family setting—circulated triumphally on Twitter
in response. In light of radical feminism’s abhorrence of the normative pres-
sure on women to reproduce at all (certainly within the nuclear-family tem-
plate), this natalist bioconservatism presents a certain irony. Yet, as I go on to
show, it is consistently in this politically ambivalent guise that antisurrogacy
interventions, commonly characterized simply as feminist, have reasserted
themselves in public life (especially Euro-American, Israeli, Indian, and Aus-
tralian public life) between 2012 and 2017. Campaigns have targeted na-
tional, international, and EU legislatures, with recent developments indicat-
ing they may prevail in the next few years (2018–20).
Raymond, then, may have cause to reverse her view, told to de Saille, that
her anti-sex-trafﬁcking campaigning has seen far greater success than her en-
deavors against reproductive technologies (de Saille 2012, 131). In any case,
Raymond has consistently ascribed all the phenomena she opposes—includ-
ing the existence of trans people—to misogyny. This framing shows signs of
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on modern-day surrogacy abolitionists. Recall that sur-
rogacy, for Raymond, is “deﬁned as the buying and selling of women who
are traded as commodities and rented uteruses for purposes of breeding”
(1989a, 92). From 2011 to 2016, some of this language was revived by
the network Stop Surrogacy Now (hashtag: #womenarenotbreeders) and
by Julie Bindel’s Guardian columns (2011, 2015, 2016). The network
NoMaternity Trafﬁc “rejoiced” onMarch 15, 2016, at the rejection of a sur-
rogacy bill by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: “it is
now obvious that surrogacy, in any form, causes women exploitation and
children trafﬁcking.”5 As such, the chances of a different message emanating
4 2015/2016 European Parliament Resolution on Human Rights, item 114, posted
November 30, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef5-//EP
//TEXT1REPORT1A8-2015-0344101DOC1XML1V0//FR.
5 NMT (No Maternity Trafﬁc) press release, “The Committee on Social Affairs of the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Rejected the Project of the Report and
Resolution on Surrogacy.” This press release was posted on March 15, 2016, but is no longer
available online.
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from the Hague Expert Group on parentage/surrogacy, along the lines of
Amnesty International’s controversial about-face on sex work—that is to
say, a pathbreaking recognition of contract gestation as work and a con-
comitant recommendation to nation-states to decriminalize it completely—
appear slim to none.
Yet the weakness of absolutist feminism has been made apparent by a
long-standing, and in large part anticolonial, feminist struggle in the anti-
prostitution context—culminating in the institutional turn toward decrimi-
nalization. Though such a turnaround has never occurred in surrogacy pol-
itics, there was a moment when FINNRAGE’s position began to implode as
it confronted just such decolonizing feminist concerns; this moment is in-
structive to consider. This nadir occurred at the point of encounter with—
and erasure of—third-world women’s agency at a FINRRAGE conference
held in Comilla, Bangladesh (Kabeer 1994). At Comilla, a number of women
articulated a demand for immediate and free access to birth control and pre-
natal diagnostics, but this was met with very little support from the eco- and
radical feminists. Naila Kabeer identiﬁes the 1989 conference as the point
where FINRRAGE’s “blanket conﬂation of technology with patriarchy, of
usewith abuse, undermine[d]whatwould otherwise have been a powerful cri-
tique of the population establishment” (1994, 202).
Kabeer criticizes speciﬁc prominent ﬁgures—Mies, Klein, and Farida
Akhtar—for imposing on their rural “sisters” an anticontraceptive stance im-
plicitly (sometimes explicitly) based on the belief that “sexual pleasure is . . .
the monopoly of men” (1994, 200). Franklin recalls:
Although someof themore prominentmembers of the networks, such
as RenateKlein, JalnaHammer,MariaMies andGenaCorea, advocated
a position of complete resistance to all forms of such technology, the re-
ality on the ground of FINRRAGE activism was much more complex.
The [FINRRAGE afﬁliate] Forum Against Oppression of Women in
Bombay, for example, had . . . not sought a complete ban on [the]
use [of amniocentesis], in part to enable women in the Bhopal region
to opt for its use to reduce the incidence of severe foetal abnormality
in the wake of the Union Carbide catastrophe. (2011, 18)
Despite these instances of successful plurivalence, Akhtar, a Bangladeshi
FINNRAGE leader, broke with her grassroots constituency at Comilla and
joined with the Anglo-European and Australian leaders in opposing all pre-
natal diagnosis technologies. Santi Rozario, writing about the same confer-
ence, avers that the FINRRAGE leaders’ “dismissal of ‘reproductive rights’ . . .
leads them to argue that abortion is unnatural and irrelevant for rural poor
women” (1999, 91).
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FINRRAGE’s critique of patriarchal technology, according to Kabeer
and Rozario, inexorably became a material stance of nonsolidarity with Ban-
gladeshi women. This was justiﬁed with reference to women’s warped con-
sciousness and to the supposed radicalism of rejecting pills, chemicals, and
technologies in favor of an autonomous bodily and ecological holism, itself
promoted by Akhtar’s seed-banking NGO.6 But, as Rozario points out, in
practice, such “autonomy” can often mean vulnerability and resignation
to the traditional control of husbands and relatives: “families, local culture,
traditions and communities are often at the root of the problems of Third
World women. They do not provide unmediated deliverance from the hands
of the imperialists or other local sources of exploitation, as Mies and Akhtar
tend to imply” (1999, 91). She continues, “technology may be male-biased,
but this does not mean that it is of no beneﬁt to women. In fact the dispos-
sessed may well view technology as empowering” (94).
De Saille (2012) notes that the planned publication of the Comilla pro-
ceedings by Zed Books was canceled as a result of the debacle. Franklin,
in her defense of FINRRAGE, admits that it amounted to a “schism,” sug-
gesting that repetitions of this failure within transnational feminist politics
rang a death knell for FINRRAGE as a mass actor (2011, 18). Although
FINRRAGE identiﬁed as a radical feminist group and poured scorn on “re-
productive liberalism” (Raymond 1989c), there was nothing radical about
proposing body holism in the face of a group of women who were collec-
tively seeking to improve their access to such technologies as abortions, con-
traceptives, and fetal screenings. On this point, Bernstein’s meta-analysis of
feminism is useful in that it prompts vigilance against the carceral liberalism
that locates “sexual menace squarely outside the home” (Bernstein 2010,
54).
Antitrans: “Feminists in bed with churchmen”
The governance of transnational adoptions has long compelled the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and other world jurisdictions to try to reach agree-
ment about what a person’s rights during infancy are: rights to family, pri-
vacy, heritage, and citizenship. The advent of surrogacy, however, places
new pressure on these same institutions to account in some way for the gen-
esis of human beings via free-market parentage templates that cross borders
and bodies. As such, present legislative crackdowns on surrogacy may be ex-
6 The NGO in question, Ubinig, has been led by Akhtar since 1984, who established it as
FINRRAGE Bangladesh. It includes a broad “development alternatives” program (http://
www.ubinig.org/).
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plained not so much as feminist but as intended to prevent the geopolitical
headaches of infant statelessness. In some cases, anti-foreign-surrogacy
laws may even be largely patriarchal-nationalist responses to perceived
abuse of the nation’s women by outsiders. It seems fair to say, then, that
“feminists did not get to own this critique [of surrogacy] once they had
elaborated it” (Briggs 2010, 361). But as we have seen, the particularMan-
ichaean radical feminism of FINRRAGE was never univocally antiestab-
lishment. Nor was it rejected wholesale by some in power. In fact there
is evidence that FINRRAGE was “taken seriously [in part because] basi-
cally it’s saying the same thing as the Catholic Church” (Woll 1992). With
this ambivalence in mind, we can parse the politics of the twenty-ﬁrst-century
resurgence in antisurrogacy discourse via a simple question: what it is that ac-
tivists, by making surrogacy the enemy, defend maternal intimacy against?
The campaign No Maternity Trafﬁc is run by the organization Interna-
tional Union for the Abolition of Surrogacy and was launched from France
onNovember 20, 2014. Its green logo features a pregnant silhouette against
a green bar code, and it seeks to protect “women and children” from “ex-
ploitation and trafﬁcking” (see n. 5). Stop Surrogacy Now was launched
from Sweden on May 11, 2015, using a red trafﬁc stop sign. Signatories
to the latter group’s inaugural petition to the International Criminal Court
included the major umbrella body the European Women’s Lobby, the US-
based Center for Bioethics and Culture, and a number of small progressive
feminist and lesbian organizations. Signatories of No Maternity Trafﬁc, for
their part, are almost exclusively faith based, pro-life, and right wing, direct-
ing their efforts at the Brussels-based European bodies. Both platforms,
however, deploy premises from international human rights law to bolster
their petitions, particularly those enshrined in the UN Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Decla-
ration of the Rights of the Child pertaining to the right to parents, national-
ity, heritage, and dignity. No Maternity Trafﬁc appeals for signatures “be-
cause human beings are not objects; because they are neither for giving,
nor renting or selling” (see n. 5); Stop Surrogacy Now states that “a woman
is a human being not a machine.”7
The latter can be interpreted as rudimentarily feminist in spirit. But this
newwave of antisurrogacy actors, feminist or not, gains its traction via a con-
servative protest-based politics based on the sanctity of what it sees as the
given biology of the body. In France, the right-wing profamily organization
7 Stop Surrogacy Now press release, “STOP SURROGACY NOW to Launch May 11,
2015,” May 11, 2015, http://www.stopsurrogacynow.com/press/#sthash.Hs4I49ii
.O1bAwqIw.dpbs.
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La Manif Pour Tous (March for All), fresh from its legislative defeat in out-
lawing same-sex marriage in 2014, remobilized that same year against surro-
gacy, what it called “la gestation pour autrui” (gestation for others, or GPA).
Activists publicly paraded plastic baby dolls in shopping carts through several
cities, picketing judiciaries associated with softening antisurrogacy legisla-
tion and drumming up support for the opposition hashtag #noGPA (La
Manif Pour Tous 2014). In New York, a stunt for the Center for Bioethics
and Culture (CBC) involved a white woman standing silently amid the
lunch-hour rush, as though homeless, holding a piece of scrap cardboard
touting “womb for rent” (CBC 2015). The bioconservative network in
question is a veteran of the US stem-cell wars, and its director, Jennifer Lahl,
is keen to network with feminist scholars.8 Since 2010, theCBChas illustrated
its antisurrogacy bulletins and fund-raising appeals with a large number of
memes: images of (almost exclusively) white women and infants, sometimes
featuring price tags, with captions: “The fertility industry sees this woman as
a commodity. ‘Like’ if you see what we see—a womanwith dignity.”Another
meme juxtaposes a black-and-white image of a swollen belly with the single
ominous word “used”; yet another shows a small boy with the phrase “what
aboutMY rights?”9 In Italy, an antisurrogacy coalition of feminist and pro-life
interests has adopted the historically resonant rhetorical question “if not now,
when?” in connection with the “liberation of maternity.”10 As signatories to
Stop SurrogacyNow, they provoke outrage with the phrase “womb for rent”:
#uteroinafﬁtto.11
The prominent antisurrogacy voices are often transphobic ones. Sheila
Jeffreys, a close collaborator of Raymond’s, also notorious for equating
transsexuality with rape or mutilation, has lately championed an antisur-
rogacy couched in the same predator imaginary. Jeffreys warns in a 2014
article—“Reject Surrogacy as Another Form of Human Trafﬁcking”—of
a pedophilic “male gay couple . . . creating a boy child by surrogacy specif-
ically for abuse” (Jeffreys 2014). An approving citer of Jeffreys, Kajsa Ekis
Ekman, is the founder of the No to Surrogacy subnetwork in the Swedish
Women’s Lobby and author of Being and Being Bought: Prostitution, Sur-
8 Four scholars of my acquaintance, including Sharmila Rudrappa, have told me that Lahl
reached out to them, presumably seeking antisurrogacy collaboration.
9 The memes in question can be found at the “Center for Bioethics and Culture Network”
Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/cbcnetwork/.
10 Se Non Ora Quando was hosted at http://snoqlibere.it, but a new website for the or-
ganization launched in 2016; see Che Libertà at http://cheliberta.it.
11 The account in question is @snoqlibere. A search for their successful hashtag #uteroin
afﬁtto (launched in 2014) can be found at https://twitter.com/hashtag/uteroinafﬁtto?src
5hash&ref_src5twsrc%5Etfw.
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rogacy, and the Split Self (2014b). Ekman argues that, “just as trafﬁcking is
a consequence of prostitution and nothing else, commercial and altruistic
surrogacy are different levels on the same scale” (2014b, 161). In her speeches,
interviews, and writings she condemns both prostitution and surrogacy—
which she has called “prostitution’s little sister” (2014c). Ekman’sManichae-
anism asserts a rigid moral interpretation of female dignity as having primacy
over women’s rights and desires. This should sound familiar: it is borrowed
from Raymond, Corea, and Klein. However, while Raymond has admitted
an antisocialist intent, Ekman, curiously, describes her position as “Marxist
and feminist.”12
There is nothingMarxist aboutBeing andBeing Bought. In so identifying,
Ekmanmay be seeking to sidestep the other tumultuous antagonism—besides
sex worker exclusion, that is—currently raging between feminists like her-
self and other feminists: namely, the issue of trans inclusion (Withers
2010). If so, however, the attempt manifestly fails. Throughout her book,
Ekman reiterates many of the mainstays of transphobic argument from The
Transsexual Empire regarding biological authenticity: she gives the game
away with the remark “a transsexual can demand that everyone call him
[sic] a woman” (2014b, 39). In one breath, Ekman inveighs against fem-
inist defenses of surrogacy, trans, femme, and sex-worker-led politics, im-
plying they are fashionable artiﬁce. As with FINRRAGE, antisurrogacy
feminism here melds with anxieties about the perceived threat of trans fem-
inist womanhood (and by analogy, self-styled, hacked, “whored out,” or
modiﬁed femininities more generally). What looms is that women enmasse
will devolve, through sometimes voluntary contact with “pharmacrats and
technodocs,” into “man-made women”: a phobic vision encompassing both
surrogate motherhood and postoperative trans women.
FINRRAGE founder Robyn Rowland writes in her antisurrogacy mono-
graph Living Laboratories: “Janice Raymond has argued convincingly that
transsexualism represents the ﬁnal colonisation of women. . . . Now the
man-made woman could become both mother and father to a child: the pa-
triarchal dream/myth becomes reality” (1992, 191). Fundamentally, then,
transphobia and technophobia reveal themselves to be tightly linked in the
antisurrogacy imaginary. The connection between surrogacy’s technological
transformation of ﬁliality and the transformation (if not always surgical) of
embodied sex enacted in transgender identity exists clearly in the minds of
antisurrogacy advocates and faith-based conservatives. We have seen evi-
12 This quotation comes from Ekman’s talk “Surrogacy Is Child Trafﬁcking,” Festival of
Dangerous Ideas, posted to YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v5MztUOF
CX9Uc.
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dence of the at-times unabashedly uninformed nexus of whorephobia, tech-
nophobia, and transphobia that motivates antisurrogacy. Recorded in black
and white is a fantastical and paranoid bioconservatism and its continuation
among a younger generation. In exhibiting this behavior, antisurrogacy
radical feminists once more ﬁnd themselves mimicking the religious Right:
“on the issue of surrogacy, feminists [remain] in bed with churchmen”
(Schmukler and Aigen 1989, 240).
In The Transsexual Empire Raymond makes the doubly paranoid claim
that trans women believe themselves “far superior” to “genetic women”
(1979, 151) and are the scheme of aDr. Frankenstein–likemalemedical con-
spiracy. To interpret this fantasy is to discern how trans women and untrou-
bled surrogates—the ﬁgure Ekman calls “the story of the Happy Breeder”
(2014b, 131)—come to stand for the provocative possibility of consciously
self-fashioned cyborg embodiment. As avatars of bioclinical patriarchy, but
also of boundary blurring, they can be attacked both for being reactionary
entrenchments of regressive binaries and for being the fragmenting force
of postmodern deconstructionism. In this vein, Australian FINRRAGE
leader Klein wrote sarcastically in 1999 that “cyborgs [are] the new feminist
icon . . . clearly superior to women” (185).
Klein’s invective against cyberfeminism attempts a catastrophist defense
of a whole self against the “cut-and-paste” predations of postmodernism,
online identity impersonation, woman-hating “medicos” wielding scalpels,
and ascendant cybercommunication media (email, which Klein admits she
struggles to use, has not researched, and ill understands; 1999, 196). The
author misunderstands as frivolous identitarianism and “lifestylism” the
landmark cyborg intervention of socialist biologist Donna Haraway (known
colloquially as “The Cyborg Manifesto”), whose contention is that the vir-
tual and organic components of the gendered body are always already co-
constitutive together with technology (1991). In attempting to grapple with
the cyborg while mocking it, missing its power as a heuristic ﬁguration of
gender and biocapital in transition, the FINRRAGE stalwart concludes by
undermining her own claims. Attempting a concession to Haraway’s episte-
mic challenge, she writes: “I do not criticise cut-and-paste baby-making be-
cause these technologies tamper with ‘nature’ . . . but rather because they
constitute medical violence against women’s bodies/minds/spirits/souls”
(Klein 1999, 197). Yet how is the baggy concept “women’s bodies/minds/
spirits/souls” not an ideology of nature? Technology is straightforwardly con-
ﬂated, on the one hand, with the structural violence of the capitalist or para-
capitalist processes it mediates (e.g., commodiﬁcation, slavery) and, on the
other, with the spiritual violence considered, in this feminism, to be intrinsic
to prostitution.
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In modern-day antisurrogacy’s vindications of human dignity, anti-queer-
parenting and antitechnological sentiments overlap as though they stem from
the same thought. The Stop Surrogacy Now press statement “a woman is a
human being, not a machine” (see n. 7), for example, encrypts the message
“a gestator must be what we understand to be a woman, which we deﬁne in
opposition to the artiﬁcial.”Yet there are in reality remarkably few substantively
technological elements—or “machines” proper—in this ﬁeld that we nonethe-
less call “assisted reproductive technology.” Although aided by various tools,
above all, in surrogacy, gestators labor; laborers gestate. In anxious disavowal
of this, the concern to differentiate the proper subject of gestation from the
“machine” becomes legible as an insistence on cisgendered maternity’s nat-
ural essence. While this rationale is left implicit, it is clear that being a ma-
chine has a deeply negative valence and that women should not be intervening
in their biology or identity (as trans people do or are perceived to do).
So, it is by rendering women machines (or attempting to) that the prac-
tice of surrogacy purportedly violates the commonsense natural order. Even
if this were true, or uniquely true in this economic subsector, it is still unclear
what the way out might be: whether, for instance, women become human
beings (again) by virtue of the eradication of surrogacy, or not. Moreover,
the three categories (woman, human being, machine) seem to be posited
as ontologically immutable. Contrariwise, I would argue for the possibility
of completely different formulations: pregnancy is a machine, not a woman;
a pregnant person is not (necessarily) a woman; a machine may form part of a
woman . . . and so on, in many possible cyborg-materialist variations. In the
sense that it disproves the supposedly self-contained and natural-automatic
character of everyday “normal” gestation—by lending gestation a collective
character, as well as heightened intentionality and craft—surrogacy points
to the surrogateness of all reproductive endeavors. From such a relational
and ﬂuid starting point, it would be more possible to explore potentially im-
portant senses in which surrogacy changes and proliferates gender roles.
Opposition to surrogacy could then become concrete, speciﬁc, and sur-
rogate led: surrogacy workplaces are ultimately irredeemably dangerous be-
cause . . . the effects of unregulated surrogacy on people’s lives are overwhelm-
ingly violent in the following ways . . . surrogacy must be decriminalized (in
order to make it safer) because. . . . However, as the position stands,
antisurrogacy centers no such concerns and remains at a high level of ab-
straction, removed from contract gestators’ ideas and desires. The classical
feminist denunciation of objectiﬁcation by Stop Surrogacy Now (“a woman
is a human being, not a machine”) is neatly married with the bioconservative
imperative to keep scientiﬁc and technological intervention in the human
body at bay. In sum, impassioned precepts about the unsalability of “life it-
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self ” and the distinction between people andmachines now overwhelmingly
serve as metonyms for other—namely, transphobic—thoughts, both in anti-
surrogacy and in what is known as the stem cell debate.
Disavowal: The truncated critique of commodiﬁed care
This article has so far shown the technophobia and transphobia in feminist
antisurrogacy past and present and insisted on the right-wing character of
these thoughts, mutually intertwined as they are with anti–sex work, as fac-
ets of opposition to cyborg self-fashioning. As we have further seen, this
anxiety’s afﬁrmative expression is a construction of the sacred and innocent
“child.” The child in question deserves—according to the antisurrogacy
worldview—to be born “normally” and “naturally” into a holistic bodily
identity that has not been complicated by biotechnology, money, or third
parties. Rejecting that view of normalcy and nature, I now further read
antisurrogacy as being in denial about the ubiquity of commercial elements
in everyday birthing, child care, and familiality.
The antisurrogacy “no” to commodiﬁcation and exploitation, I argue, is a
truncated one. It fails to see the already elaborately surrogated multitudes
who sustain the inside and outside of nuclear familiality. Not going so far
as to abhor the conditions of possibility for the alienation and sale of life-
giving labor power (which would require transforming these systems at the
root), antisurrogacy selectively repudiates their manifestation in the surro-
gacy industry. It does so, moreover, from a moral standpoint that often col-
lapses the distinction between normative and descriptive claims: “bearing a
child should not be a job” becomes “bearing a child is not a job.” The dec-
laration is wishfully ontological, abolishing by ﬁat the ensemble of economic
relations by which reproduction is alienated and structured as (waged or
unwaged) work for the majority of twenty-ﬁrst-century humanity. The cam-
paigners’ approach thereby enacts a structurally antifeminist disavowal of
the existence of forms of gendered, racialized labor as labor—affective, emo-
tional, reproductive, and care work whose importance to capitalism’s func-
tioning has been demonstrated by radical materialist feminists for several de-
cades. This proposition then segues into the conclusion of this article: the
possibility that “surrogacy” is a generative way of describing the myriad mu-
tual dependencies upon which the reproduction of everyday life depends.
In 2015, the Center for Bioethics and Culture released an antisurrogacy
ﬁlm. Breeders: A Subclass of Women? (2015) puts a spotlight on the plight of
Jessica Kern, who was conceived and birthed in the mid-1980s via a “tradi-
tional” contract, in which the surrogate gestator is the embryo’s genetic par-
ent. As an adult “surrobaby,” Kern is the author of a weblog, The Other Side
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of Surrogacy, and acts as a spokesperson for several antisurrogacy groups.
Kern’s mediators include Jennifer Lahl, director of the Center for Bioethics
and Culture, who often ventriloquizes Kern’s position rather than quoting
the rather millenarian and conspiratorial tone of the blog. “Jessica . . . feels
very strongly against the reality that her birth mother was basically paid
$10,000 to hand her over,” Lahl explains, “so she refers to herself as a prod-
uct” (Breeders 2015). Ekman is also fond of citing Kern’s anecdotal experi-
ences. She told the 2014 Festival of Dangerous Ideas, “when you know [as
Kern does] the only reason you exist is a big fat paycheck, it doesn’t feel that
nice.”13 In this section, I consider this statement differently and explore the
thought that all of us exist because of a paycheck—innumerable paychecks,
in fact. I will address the truncation inherent in antisurrogacy’s critique of
commodiﬁcation and brieﬂy consider the racialized history of enslaved,
waged, and indentured mothering, which white antisurrogacy entirely over-
looks.
In her 2014 address, Ekman gave a gloss on “a Marxist” concept: “Re-
iﬁcation. What is that? It was used by the Hungarian Marxist Lukács. And
what hemeans by reiﬁcation is when you commodify part of human life itself,
as one is in work. I think this concept most applies to surrogacy. Because
you’re reifying something that used to be just part of life.”14 Ekman swiftly
moves on with her speech and never returns to this massive claim. On the
one hand, Ekman makes clear that she deems an ahistoric, platonic practice
of pregnancy to be themost fundamental part of “human life.”On the other,
she has conceded that the violence of reiﬁcation applies to all work and all
commodiﬁcation of human labor power. As such, what Ekman lacks is an
appreciation of the dual characteristic of social reproduction, which is to say,
the constant and contradictory coexistence of various capitalist imperatives
and extracapitalist prerogatives within our life activities.
Caring for children reproduces a labor force for capitalism’s beneﬁt while
at the same time potentially fostering conscious, unruly, anticapitalist sub-
jects. Pregnancy is no exception, although its culturally sacred emotional
freight situates it, together with heterosexual copulation, at a position within
the ﬁeld of labor so deeply entangled with the notion of womanhood’s fun-
damental nature (“just part of life”) that its enactment is mistakenly identi-
ﬁed with the laborer’s selfhood—to alienate it is to sell one’s self. Ekman un-
critically reproduces these beliefs and explicitly refuses (or misunderstands)
the concept of professional affective labor in an interview in Feminist Cur-
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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rent. In a segment meant to justify her assertion that sex work is not work,
she sarcastically proposes: “let all the women lie there [during their sex
work] and do nothing, and just look at their watches—then see how much
the men like it! Prostitution is a lie. It’s overly simplistic to say it’s just a job”
(Ekman 2014a). Since countless forms of labor involve fulﬁlling someone’s
expectations—affectively—in some capacity, it’s not clear how this bolsters
Ekman’s argument. Indeed, of how many jobs can it be said that they are
just jobs?
Far from being overly simplistic, a materialist-feminist account of com-
mercial copulation must attempt to do justice to the overlap women experi-
ence between it—with its professional demands to feign nonboredom, to
regulate enjoyment—and their other “free” heterosexual lovemaking, at-
tending to the speciﬁcity of both types of emotional labor. Yet, paradoxi-
cally, the necessity of performing orgasm convincingly is what tells Ekman
that something other than work is the substance of sex work. An analogous
disquiet, in fact, haunts her antisurrogacy position: disquiet about the af-
fects of gestational nonparenting and nongestational parenting. The issue
here is her reluctance to consider that bonding in utero (for gestational par-
ents) might in some ways also be a kind of work or that the commercially
tainted adoptive care of a child (such as that undertaken by commissioning
parents) might, in the end, be just as authentic and good (or bad) as any
other form of mother love.
Kern’s case does not speak precisely to today’s surrogacy industry and as
such represents an awkward ﬁgurehead for the opposition. Kern’s surrogate
mother was also her genetic mother, but so-called traditional surrogacy con-
tracts like these are today very rare compared to purely gestational surrogacy,
in which the surrogate’s genetic material does not ﬁgure in the IVF. The
continuum between antiadoption and antisurrogacy politics thus becomes
much harder to sustain in reference to the actual biogenetic parent. In many
ways, the lobby’s principled stance on adoption should lead it to support
rather than condemn most contemporary surrogacy arrangements, because
babies often end up with their genetic relations. As a result of this contra-
diction, in a promotional video for Breeders, Lahl is forced to gesture apotro-
paically at an undeﬁned evil: “no matter how you slice it, no matter how
much you think, if we don’t pay women, or if we do pay women, or if we
do it for family members, or if we do it for strangers, it doesn’t go well, and
there’s no guarantee that it will go well.”15
15 The ofﬁcial trailer for Breeders can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
5GNNCqs52jFU.
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What is “it”? What is Lahl defending society against? She continues: “be-
cause what happens, and what should happen, is that mothers, women, and
children bond and connect.”16 It appears, then, that something that cannot
but happen and that should happen is the problem. Lahl renders the sup-
posed evils of surrogacy and adoption indistinguishable. However, there is
no elaboration on the nature of that antinomy. Implicitly, a stark alternative
is evoked: a binary between being a product of gestational labor other than
your social mother’s or experiencing love. Switching tack repeatedly to dis-
tance herself from this claim, Lahl adds, “and there are health risks to these
more high-tech arrangements. And money unfortunately corrupts a lot of
what happens in this industry.” She is covering all bases. If we pose the
question again—what is it that threatens maternal intimacy, in the view of
antisurrogacy?—it appears that, for the Center for Bioethics and Culture, it
is the conscious act of adopting an infant.
In his sociology of gestation and abortion, Luc Boltanski establishes that
all newborns require the relevant committed adults to symbolically adopt
them (Boltanski 2013). Even to the gestator, the fetus is always a kind of
stranger, even as the two bond. In Lahl’s view, of course, most babies do
not require such adoption; they are not and should not be strangers. For
Lahl, we do not somuch encounter infants and choose to perform care labor
for them, again and again and again; rather, we naturally love them and au-
tomatically maintain them where they always already belonged. In this view,
society can and should minimize the unpleasantness that inevitably results
from displacing babies, but it should do so for the very same reason that pro-
ponents of surrogacy and adoption are optimistic about careful displace-
ments. Namely, bonding with the infant begins not only within but also
and to a far greater extent after pregnancy.
There may be no way for an industry of infertility solutions to avoid ro-
manticizing or naturalizing the spontaneous love of babies—that simulta-
neously joyous and viciously normative force overwhich feminism has staged
disputes since its earliest days. For antisurrogacy advocates—as in the Stop
Surrogacy Now press statement—“there is no right to a child.” A child be-
longs to the person who bore it, Stop Surrogacy Now argues: “rich people
must be stopped from using a woman as a living incubator and then taking
their baby away and showing it off as their own” (see n. 7). Rich or poor, if
one cannot coinitiate a “normal” gestation, one must either accommodate
oneself to childlessness or else adopt. There is, for these activists, no such
thing as gestation work, a gestation job. But couldn’t the caring duties im-
plied by gestation be better vindicated as everybody’s job?
16 Ibid.
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Conclusion
A core tension within feminist antisurrogacy is its dependence on a sense
of surrogacy as a valid semiotic referent even as it attacks the validity of the
concept. The fascinating slipperiness of the term is captured in kinship an-
thropologist Marilyn Strathern’s key structuralist discussions, which ask, for
example, why it is not the commissioningmother who is designated the sur-
rogate, pointing out that the hired gestator could equally be labeled surro-
gate wife (1998). Disinclined to draw these critical links between forms of
exploitation and domination inherent in commercial and uncommercial re-
productive activity alike, early exponents of surrogacy abolition objected to
the very term itself. Some—including those who assembled the “Death of
the Female” panel that was formative for FINRRAGE—considered refusing
to use it. They did so when so-called traditional surrogacy was still common,
as well as when it was not, on the basis that what was called surrogacy merely
repackaged and denied motherhood, enabling a marketization that society
would otherwise not accept. Although this a priori refusal to use the term
was never universalized in antisurrogacy, in the sense that sloganeering con-
tinues to use the alliterative phrase “stop surrogacy,” the idea that there can
only ever be one mother survives today, both in popular commentaries and
state edicts.
One could reject the term “surrogacy” for a quite different reason: be-
cause one rejects the idea of unitary maternal authenticity in the ﬁrst place,
as well as the various bioethical ediﬁces resting on it. But to posit an invalu-
able, irreplaceable, indivisible motherhood is to ignore multiple historic trans-
formations in the organization of maternity. Our gestation-related common
sense about parentage and surrogacy often leads us to drop even our best-
seasoned critiques of the unmarked (normal, default) category as soon as we
turn to its artiﬁcially engineered other. We forget diverse Western and non-
Western practices of multiple mothering, the centuries-long Western legal
encoding of all fetuses and children as the exclusive custodial property of fa-
thers, and, most glaringly, the systematic and proﬁtable control of enslaved
women’s reproduction during early capitalist chattel slavery. Dorothy Rob-
erts has amply documented the whiteness built in to the unmarked subject of
motherhood, identifying an ongoing history of systemic devaluation of black
reproduction that seeks to render black motherhood comparatively mean-
ingless (1997). Indeed, throughout history, many women have received in-
formal stipends or wages for literally reproductive activity accruing to homes
other than their own, including—in the case of the enslaved, whose repro-
ductive lives were legally owned—gestation. Nongestational mothering sur-
rogates such as wet nurses, full-time nannies, and babysitters have been re-
sponsible for much of the biological reproduction of the ruling classes.
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The feminist antisurrogacy discourses presented in this discussion have
largely erased this wider, messier history of surrogacy, pretending that, be-
cause of its new technological dimensions, the trend is entirely novel. Today,
however, the class disparity between producers and consumers of gesta-
tional labor grows difﬁcult to ignore, indicating a long-standing ﬁssure be-
tween bourgeois and proletarian, white and nonwhite motherhoods. To
accept a discussion of motherhood as given and primordial, then, is to cling
to an ahistorical perspective incapable of apprehending the differing forms
that the reproductive (family) unit has taken both within and outside of
capitalism—not to mention the forms it could take in the future. It would
seem, then, that crying out—as in the classic phrases “off our backs! hands
off maternity!”—is misleading enough to leave the suffocating private and
patriarchal ediﬁce of maternity intact. None of us has really known a mater-
nity wholly unburdened by capitalism, patriarchy, transmisogyny, racism,
and colonialism. Moreover, it is impossible to imagine a pure, technology-
free maternity, a form of gestation without “hands” all over it.
As we’ve seen, there was little to no strategic unity among the many
women who became alerted to, and enraged by, the unmistakable misogy-
nistic logics at work in scientiﬁc knowledge production throughout the past
century. This history was a bloody one characterized by reckless contracep-
tive and obstetric drug testing, forced sterilizations, and fetal femicide. Yet
as members of FINRRAGE moved to defend intimate biology from grand
and often millenarian bogeymen—“death of the female,” “reproductive slav-
ery,” and so on—in practice they were questioning some commercial appli-
cations of particular technologies to certain women in speciﬁc locations.
Thus, again and again, the urgent necessity for feminists to denounce the
ill effects of reproductive “engineering” has resulted in a politics that repro-
duces a confounding dichotomy—technology or reproduction.
It is urgent that we reevaluate the commercial gestational surrogate as a
cyborg reproducer, or other mother, who stands side by side with all moth-
ers as a gift giver and producer, a care worker, and above all, a political be-
ing. I claim, further, that future directions for surrogacy politics involve un-
apologetically redrawing the polemical links between surrogacy and sex
work. These have hitherto been drawn for the purposes of opposing both
sectors as degradations of special spheres of human life (motherhood and
sexuality). Thus, the critical task we face is to afﬁrm links such that the hy-
brid, economic, and extra-economic character of both sexual and parental
care can become more apparent. A transformational theorization should
jointly situate these industries within circuits of survival and social reproduc-
tion, viewing them as forms of life and work that are themselves in ﬂux. If
we can achieve this, antisurrogacy becomes a meaningless proposition. If we
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can build concrete forms of solidarity among all bearers of children, we may
annihilate the present meaning of surrogacy and transform procreative
property relations into a genuinely collective mode of reproduction.
Geography Department
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